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Abstract: This paper examines post-Soviet reforms on human capital 
development in Russia. The primitivization of economy in the first decade 
of reforms resulted in growing underemployment of skilled labour that 
drove out two streams of brain drain, viz. one, through classical emigration, 
and two, through the outflow of skilled labour into a wide range of survival 
activities from shuttle trade to subsistence farming. The consequences of 
this for the Russian economy were dire as it led to the depreciation and 
degradation of the national human capital stock. The second decade of 
reforms generated controversial implications for Russia’s national human 
capital. On the one hand, it was characterized by the emergence and 
exacerbation of a wide range of supply-demand human capital mismatches. 
On the other hand, the revival of labour demand and the partial substitution 
of direct brain drain for outsourcing widened opportunities for the 
preservation and accumulation of national human capital.
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1.  Introduction 
In the world of today the role of human capital in securing competitiveness 
and well-being of nations is rapidly increasing. According to the theory of 
endogenous growth, human capital contributes to economic growth at least in 
three ways. First, it raises productivity of workers due to upgraded skills and 
better education. Second, it is a source of new ideas and innovations. Third, it 
facilitates dissemination and embeddedness of new ideas and practices leading 
to more effective economic performance (Romer, 1989, 1990; Lucas, 1988; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992). 
However, these theoretical findings meet controversial empirical evidence 
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is more often established in developed Western economies than in the Third 
World and economies in transition. The exceptions are rapidly industrializing 
countries such as China, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore (see Rasiah and Lin, 2005; 
Saxenian, 2006; Rasiah et al., 2010). According to Pritchett (2001) a profound 
increase in educational attainment and enrolment in developing countries 
between 1960 and 1985 made an unexpectedly small contribution to economic 
growth. Much the same conclusions can be found in other papers (Benhabib 
and Spiegel, 1994; Bils and Klenow, 2000; Barro and Lee, 2001). 
A similar problem persists in many transition economies. The difference 
is that unlike in the developing world the majority of these countries such as 
Russia initially boasted a vast stock of human capital. However, during the 
two decades of post-Soviet reforms in Russia this potential competitive advan-
tage failed to contribute to sustainable economic growth or boost innovation. 
In addition, people have become more and more apprehensive as growing 
weaknesses in human capital have constrained economic development. 
Thus, this paper seeks to examine the inconsistencies in the development 
of human capital in Russia during the period of reforms since the 1990s. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the second part some theoretical and 
empirical approaches to the relationship between human capital and growth 
are reviewed. In the next two sections, trends in employment-based human 
capital development during the two stages of market reforms (economic 
decline of the 1990s and recovery growth of the 2000s) are analyzed. The final 
section presents some conclusions and implications of the current economic 
crisis for human capital development. 
2.  Literature Review
Scholarly accounts of the role of human capital in economic development 
have a long history (Smith, 1776; Marshall, 1890; Marx, 1956). Subsequent 
work can be traced to Penrose (1959), Polanyi (1966) and Rosenberg (1976) 
who discussed extensively the specific type and role human capital plays in 
innovation and growth. Lucas (1988) and Romer (1989) acknowledged the 
effects of increasing returns by including such developments in mainstream 
models. Nelson and Pack (1999) made a persuasive case for the role of 
investment and its impact on human capital in Korea and Taiwan in driving 
rapid economic growth. Saxenian (1994, 2006), Rasiah (1994, 1995) and 
Rasiah and Lin (2005) subsequently argued a similar effect from in-house 
accumulation of human capital in firms that then relocated to start new firms 
in dynamic clusters. However, the analysis of human capital accumulation 
and its role in economic development is uniquely different in Russia from the 
accounts above, as official endowments based on United Nations Development 
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countries, and yet its contribution to economic development during the reform 
decades has been contentious. 
Abundance and high quality of national human capital was routinely 
considered Russia’s key competitive advantage. Standard proxies for human 
capital show high endowments in Russia. According to the data set supplied 
by Barro and Lee (2001), Russia scored high in education attainment rankings 
during the period 1960-2000, placing it among the top ten of 138 countries. 
However, in the course of socioeconomic transformation since reforms began 
in the 1990s Russia’s position has fallen. At the start of reforms in early 
1990s, Russia held third to fourth positions behind the United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand. Indeed Russia has remained almost on par with 
countries enjoying a very high human development index under the United 
Nations classification (UNDP, 2010: 143-146). In addition, Russia is ahead 
of most developed countries on indicators such as enrolment rates, absolute 
numbers and share of scientists and researchers per million persons, number 
of graduate and post-graduate students per 10,000 people. The same goes for 
the formal educational characteristics of the economically active population 
(see Table 1). 
However in contrast to direct proxies, outcome based human capital 
indicators are much less favourable. During the two post-Soviet decades, 
this potential competitive advantage was not realized either at the macro or 
Table 1:  Distribution of Economically Active Population by Education, 
  2001 and 2007 
  Share, %
Country  Primary or less  Secondary  Tertiary
  2001  2007  2001  2007  2001  2007
USA  17.1  9.5  39.5  29.4  43.3  61.1
New Zealand  20.4  17.9  49.6  41.1  27.2  37.3
UK  17.5  21.5  47.4  45.9  26.8  31.9
Germany   17.3  17.0  58.9  59.0  23.8  23.9
France  26.9  26.0  46.9  44.3  26.2  29.4
Korea  14.2  23.0  43.7  42.0  24.9  35.0
Brazil*  73.9  62.5  18.6  28.9  6.9  8.6
Russia  12.1  6.4  33.9  41.1  54.0  52.5
Note:  * 11+ years old.
Source: Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM). Geneva, ILO. http://www.
ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/, downloaded on 3 January   
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micro levels. From a strong country with strong military leanings, Russia’s 
industrial economy prior to reforms enjoyed many millions of skilled workers 
who were engaged in high-tech and innovative activities. With reforms, 
the economy gradually transformed into a mid-level economy heavily 
dependent on oil and gas in securing economic growth with negligible share 
of innovative goods and services either in GDP or in export. Thus, at the 
macro-level the abundant human capital endowment was not used to direct 
innovation-based growth.
On the micro-level the situation is even less encouraging than in the 
developing countries where a scarcity of human capital leads to high returns to 
education (Pritchett, 2001; van Leeuwen and Foldvari, 2008). Skilled labour 
was always underpaid in Russia, which meant little or no monetary returns 
on human capital investment (Gregory and Kohlhase, 1988). Nevertheless, in 
the pre-reform times, acquiring tertiary education gave important intangible 
rewards like status, autonomy at work, higher job satisfaction and better 
working conditions. Since the turn of the millennium, most of the intangible 
rewards are gone while individual returns on education remain low. As a 
result, the relative ranking of national human capital stock can be readjusted 
downwards to 70-80 per cent of that of the United States if measured by 
accumulated education, and 10-20 per cent if measured by expected future 
earnings (Валентей and Нестеров, 1999; van Leeuwen and Foldvari, 2008). 
This situation raises serious doubts over Russia’s educational endowments. Is 
Russia’s human capital stock as good as the numbers suggest? 
Indeed, the opposite is true for many developing countries. Van Leeuwen 
and Foldvari (2008) give a characteristic example of Brazil where national 
human capital stock seems to be higher than that in Austria or the Nether-
lands. It is comparable to that of Finland if measured by market value, but 
less than a half of Austria if measured by direct proxies like educational 
attainment. Thus, low individual returns to education do not necessarily 
reflect inefficient use or low quality of human capital just as higher returns as 
in the case of developing countries do not automatically imply high quality 
and efficient use.
One possible explanation of the low human capital returns in Russia 
is that the most commonly used indicators ignore quality of education. In 
order to take into account the quality factor, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) 
suggest using student scores on international examinations as a quality proxy. 
According to the results of international comparative tests conducted among 
secondary school students of 40 countries, in early 1990s Russia was close 
to the top of the list and in the middle of the decade still had a respectable 
ranking in the upper-third. Thus, at least during the first decade of reforms, 
which was characterized by severe economic decline, the quality of education 
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Another explanation lies in the underutilization of the national human 
capital. The most common case is unemployment. Le et al. (2006) introduce 
a concept of working human capital by excluding from the national stock of 
human capital the unemployed and economically inactive part of population. 
In Russia, underemployment, including underutilization of skilled labour, 
played an at least as important role. 
Druska et al. (2002) and Vinogradov (2004) link low returns on human 
capital in the post-Soviet Russia and the inability of highly educated 
manpower to contribute adequately to economic modernization and sustainable 
development, to a specific version of human capital mismatch, manifesting 
itself in a distorted occupational structure of human capital inherited from 
the centrally planned Soviet economy. In a non-market economy practicing 
centralized allocation of resources there was little need for professionals in 
sales, marketing or finance, reflecting the ‘technocratic bias’ of professional 
education. A large share of students specialized in science and technology 
education, while training in humanities and social sciences was provided on 
a relatively modest scale. In the second half of the 20th century, engineers 
accounted for about one-third of total employment.
Sometimes it is argued that market reforms led to per saltum depreciation 
and loss of a large portion of the national human capital that was accumulated 
during the Soviet regime, manifesting in a sharp fall of monetary and non-
monetary rewards enjoyed by skilled labour (Нестерова and Сабирьянова, 
1998). It is worth noting, however, that individual returns depend not 
only upon the quality and size of the human asset (in our case – skills and 
competences possessed by individuals) but also upon external circumstances, 
including market demand for specific varieties of skilled labour and the 
institutional context in which human capital functions (Тамбовцев, 2005: 9; 
van Leeuwen and Foldvari, 2008: 191). At least two different situations when 
human capital is undervalued (or sometimes overvalued) could be pointed 
out. First, human capital may be underutilized, for example when skilled 
workers perform low skilled work. Second, overall returns on employees’ 
human capital may be distributed between employee and employer in favour 
of the latter. The employee share depends upon institutional factors such as 
protection of workers’ rights through state regulation, trade union activities, 
civil society initiatives and socially responsible behaviour of firms. In other 
words, the outcomes generated by human capital may not reach rank-and-file 
employees, but instead may be pocketed by other economic agents.
The long-term consequences of these two situations are also different. In 
the first case, the regular process of on-the-job human capital accumulation 
stopped, which was followed by the inevitable degradation of skills and work 
morale. In the second case, the individual human capital stock kept increasing 
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globalizing world, the latter meant looking for work in the international labour 
market. Consequently strong and successful economies began to enjoy wider 
opportunities to replenish deficits in their national human capital stock by 
hiring these skilled migrants (Rodriguez-Pose, 2003: 3). Post-Soviet Russia 
faced both processes, with its intensity being highest during the first decade 
of reforms. 
3.  Causes and Features of Brain Drain during Economic Decline 
The Russian reforms were aimed at a dual goal of facilitating the transition 
from a centrally planned to a market based economic system and to meet the 
competitive demands of the global economy, which was both ambitious and 
associated with grave risks both in the economic and social spheres. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that Soviet Russia enjoyed signifi-
cant advantages over most developing countries and many countries that 
were part of the former Soviet bloc in not only a well-educated labour force, 
but also the complementary endowments such as a vibrant core of high-tech 
industries (though mainly defence oriented). It also had a developed system of 
social guarantees in many aspects compatible with the demands of a modern 
welfare state. In other words, the socioeconomic system of the Soviet Union 
could rather be characterized as biased than as unmodern. It produced stable 
demand for skilled labour and offered decent opportunities for human capital 
development. Therefore, unlike most developing countries, Russia faced 
market reforms with considerable human capital and social endowments. 
Unfortunately with the lifting of the ‘iron curtain’ the standard neo-liberal 
approach to shaping the reforms based on the mainstream economic paradigm 
institutionalized in the Washington Consensus principles that were adopted, 
failed to connect effectively with the endowments Russia enjoyed. The 
selected strategy of minimizing the role of the state in economic and social 
spheres and rapid privatization consistently implemented in Russia during 
the first decade of reforms had very controversial results. The spontaneous 
unleashing of market forces was not accompanied by a coherent state policy 
aimed at correcting the structural biases in the economy, at the efficient 
utilization of manpower and accumulation of human capital, and at adequate 
safety nets for the preservation of the national human resources. Social policy 
of the state was reduced to a ‘ramshackle’ protection aimed at compensating 
(at least to some minimum extent) the costs of reform to the most vulnerable 
population groups in order to avoid social unrest. The result was severe 
economic decline accompanied by regressive changes in the structure of GDP 
and employment, diminishing socioeconomic security of population and rapid 
exacerbation of inequality. The situation undermined both the initiative and 
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3.1  Primitivization of Employment and Wage Bias
During the period of market reforms the quality and structure of wage 
employment has undergone significant changes. At first glance the shift in 
employment under economic liberalization may be assessed as a positive trend 
for there was stable growth of employment in services (from 41.9% in 1992 to 
53.1% in 2000). Even a decline in the share of primary and secondary sectors 
(see Table 2) corresponds to the long-term shift in employment observed in 
developed market economies and this is sometimes assessed as a positive 
process reflecting the transition to a post-industrial stage (Вишневская et al., 
2002: 72-74). However as services start to account for a greater share of GDP 
when the share of the secondary sectors contract in the face of a slowdown or 
fall in productivity in the latter, it is referred to by Rowthorn and Wells (1987) 
as negative deindustrialization. 
The reality of negative deindustrialization indeed appears to mirror the 
impact of market reforms on Russia if we look more carefully at the factors 
underlying the shift observed and the inner structure of the service sector. 
The decline in industrial employment was due to a profound economic crisis 
and was accompanied by unfavourable changes in the sector as the share of 
manufacturing value added in GDP declined against a rapid expansion in 
exports from the extractive sector. The share of mining in overall industrial 
Table 2:  Employment Distribution by Broad Economic Sectors, Russia, 
  1992-2004
  Employment (year average)
Sector of economy
  1992  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004
Agriculture   10336  10003  8609  8200  7947  7480  7054
  (thousand persons) 
Share (%)  14.3  15.1  13.4  12.7  12.2  11.4  10.7
Manufacturing, mining   29211  23369  19545  19707  19516  19425  19270
  & construction
  (thousand persons) 
Share (%)  40.6  35.2  30.4  30.5  29.8  29.6  29.2
Services   30210  31604  34135  34676  35704  36440  37054
  (thousand persons)
Share (%)  41.9  46.8  53.1  53.5  54.8  55.5  56.3
Source:  Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/, 
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employment increased from 12.5 per cent in 1990 to 21 per cent in 1998, and 
25 per cent at the turn of the millennium, while the corresponding figures 
for engineering industry were 38, 30 and 27 per cent respectively, for light 
industry were 11, 6.7 and 6 per cent respectively. Per capita production of 
basic food products and consumer goods also went down when no signs of 
basic needs saturation were observed. 
The growth of employment in the tertiary sector was mainly due to an 
expansion of trade (often referred to as ‘shuttle’ trade with imported goods), 
which grew more than twofold, and public administration. At the same time 
the share of industries responsible for the quality of economic growth and 
human capital formation increased only slightly (see Table 3). Clearly then, 
the shift in the economic structure had concealed a disturbing tendency to 
primitivization of employment. 
The worsening employment structure was accompanied not only by a 
threefold reduction in average real wages, but also by their redistribution 
to sections of economy benefiting from globalization – the fuel and energy 
Table 3:  Employment Distribution by Economic Sectors, Russia, 1992-2004
   (percentage)
  Share of employment
Branch of economy
  1992  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004
Agriculture  14.3  15.1  13.4  12.7  12.2  11.4  10.7
Manufacturing &   29.6  25.8  22.6  22.7  22.2  21.9  21.4
  mining
Construction  11.0  9.3  7.8  7.8  7.6  7.7  7.8
Services  41.9  46.8  53.1  53.5  54.8  55.5  56.3
Transport and   7.8  7.9  7.8  7.8  7.7  7.8  7.8
  communications
Trade & catering  7.9  10.1  14.6  15.4  16.6  16.8  17.2
Housing &    4.1  4.5  5.2  5.0  4.9  4.9  4.8
  communal services 
Health & social   5.9  6.7  7.0  7.0  7.0  7.1  7.3
  security
Education  8.9  9.3  9.1  9.0  9.0  9.1  9.2
Culture   1.5  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.9  2.0
R&D  3,2  2,5  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.8
Finances  0.7  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.3  1.4
Public administration  1.9  2.9  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.7  4.8
Source:  Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/, 
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complex and financial sector (see Table 4). Average wages in the oil and gas 
sector exceeded average wages in light industry, education and health by 4-6 
times to say virtually nothing about agriculture. Taking into account the high 
incidence of wage arrears in the less fortunate branches of economy the wage 
gap between privilege and underprivileged sectors began to widen. 
Thus, good jobs providing relatively higher wages and at the same time 
higher level of work-related security became increasingly concentrated in the 
privileged sectors of the Russian economy. The key trend in wage distribution 
has been increasing dependence on the privileged sectors with a consequent 
deleterious impact on the diminishing role of education, skill and performance 
level. It gave a special accent to the problem of ‘the working poor’. Unlike 
the situation in developed economies where this problem is acute mainly for 
low skilled and less educated workers, in Russia it included a large share of 
professionals employed in the public sector, including teachers, physicians 
and librarians. In the 1990s the wages of medical doctors, paramedics, nurses, 
instructors at preschool centres fell below the poverty line while the wages 
of teachers and pedagogues exceeded the subsistence minimum by a mere 
Table 4: Relative Wage Levels by Economy Sectors, Russia, 1990-2000
  Wage rate as % of national average
  1990  1992  1995  1998  2000
Agriculture  95  66  50  45  40
Manufacturing & mining  103  118  112  115  123
Energy  121  221  209  203  181
Fuel  148  290  256  237  298
Ferrous metals  117  170  136  136  158
Non-ferrous metals  145  250  224  220  278
Engineering  101  87  85  89  95
Light  82  85  56  51  54
Food  103  127  118  116  108
Construction  124  134  126  127  126
Trade &catering  85  81  76  82  71
Housing & communal services  74  82  102  105  88
Health & social security  67  66  73  69  62
Education  67  61  65  63  56
Culture   62  52  61  62  55
R&D  113  64  77  99  122
Finances  135  204  163  199  244
Source:  Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/, 
accessed on 3 January 2011.
Branch of Economy244      Irina Soboleva  
1.1-1.4 times. According to the first round of people’s security survey (PSS) 
conducted by the Institute of Economy in three regions of Russia as a part of 
ILO Socio-Economic Security Program, among employees with wages below 
the subsistence minimum, 28.8 per cent possessed university education and 
another 43.3 per cent non-university tertiary education. The fall in wages in 
the public sector industries – that have been vital for human development and 
innovation and concentrating high skilled manpower – was more significant 
than in other industries. The inevitable result of these developments was the 
intensification of brain drain from the underprivileged sectors of economy. 
3.2  Brain Drain
In the first decade of transition, few categories of workers have benefited 
from market reforms as the primitivization of economy led to growing 
underemployment and hence undervaluation of skilled labour, which has 
caused brain drain. On the one hand, there has been emigration of the elite 
strata of national human resources to countries offering better employment 
prospects. On the other hand, there has been a mass outflow of production 
workers and budget sector employees into lower skilled but better remu-
nerative activities.1 The most widespread field of internal brain drain was 
shuttle trade. 
Shuttle trade is a sort of micro-entrepreneurial activity involving regular 
short trips abroad to buy merchandize, returning and selling it in the street 
markets. Since shuttle trade activities belong to the informal economy there 
are no official statistical data on their scale or trends. According to expert 
assessments, however, during the first decade of reforms at least 10 million 
people (about 15% of economically active population) quit their occupations 
to work in shuttle trade with another 10 million having shuttle trade as 
secondary employment (Мельниченко et al., 1997; Иванов, 2004). The 
new shuttle entrepreneurs were representatives of different professions from 
military engineers to musicians, teachers and medical doctors, but the activity 
was most widespread among well-educated people of prime working age. 
According to a survey of small city migrants conducted in 2000, 90 per cent 
of shuttle traders had at least tertiary education and 86 per cent were between 
30 and 50 years old (Флоринская and Рощина, 2004). Another study of 
shuttle traders conducted in 5 regions of Russia revealed that representatives 
of this occupational group were typically between 30 and 40 years old and 
university graduates. Many of them had science degrees (Алешкина, 2007).
Being initially an involuntary choice, shuttle trade has become an 
important survival mechanism in the absence of regular safety nets. According 
to a survey conducted by the Institute for Complex Strategic Research in 
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low, while among households of shuttle migrants the corresponding figure 
was only 2.5 per cent with 63 per cent considering their material well-being 
as ‘very good’ and ‘good’. 
A characteristic statement of shuttle migrant family member is worth 
citation here: 
It is solely due to shuttle trade that my family managed to survive. In the 
beginning of the 1990s they stopped to pay wages in time to my mother in the 
health centre where she worked and to my father at his plant. And with the 
galloping inflation when paid at last the wages were worth nothing. And we – two 
children – had to eat something. So my mother had no other choice but to get 
engaged in shuttle trips and selling things in the market. (Internet discussion on 
shuttle trade, http://homeidea.ru/index.php?topic=1001.0, accessed on 02.01.2011 
translated from Russian.) 
Some researchers point out that shuttle traders acquired new market skills 
in the process of learning by doing (Воробьев, 2001: 11-13). However, the 
long-term prospects of shuttle trade are considered negative as a substantial 
share of high-level and mid-level professionals and skilled blue-collar workers 
lost their specific human capital skills and knowledge, thereby potentially 
laying the basis for structural labour market deficits in the next decade. 
After shuttle trade, the second important form of survival behaviour 
rapidly gaining ground during the period of reforms and economic decline 
was subsidiary farming. With the fall in real wages and a vast expansion 
of the so called administrative leave at industrial enterprises, the outflow of 
urban production workers into non-market agricultural activities performed 
at small countryside allotments of land became a widespread phenomenon. 
As a result, the estimated share of household subsidiary farming in the 
national agricultural output grew from 26.3 per cent in 1990 to 53.6 per cent 
in 2000. According to the National Labour Force Survey data, at the peak of 
agricultural season the share of working hours spent in subsidiary farming in 
the total actual hours worked in the late 1990s amounted to 12-19 per cent 
for men and 15-24 per cent for women. The share of employed population 
engaged at the same time in subsidiary farming in the May-August months 
typically exceeded 30 per cent.
Another negative trend of the 1990s was intensification of classical brain 
drain from the R&D sector, which devastated the elite strata of national 
human resources. According to expert assessments, between 1990 and 2000 
public investment in R&D was slashed by 15-20 times (Фортов, 2002: 43). 
The fall of public research funds was accompanied by a reduction of corporate 
spending. During the first decade of reform the majority of Russian firms in 
the manufacturing sector experienced financial difficulties and, thus, were 
forced to abandon long-term development goals and accept the strategy of 
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Thus, the share of firms contribution in overall R&D expenditure decreased 
from 62 per cent to just 6 per cent (Львов and Сорокин, 2005: 133-135). The 
corporate demand for skilled research personnel almost evaporated, which 
drove out-migration of scientists and engineers.
Employment in R&D decreased from 2.8 million in 1990 to 1.2 million 
in 1998 and 0.8 million in 2002. The direct outflow of researchers from the 
country accounted for a substantial part of the decrease. During the first 
decade of reforms, Russia lost 60 per cent of mathematicians and about 50 
per cent of physicists and biologists. The brain drain reached its peak in the 
late 1990s when scientists quit Russia in teams, sometimes even managing to 
relocate abroad in teams (Голдфилд, 2007).
According to data from the national passport-visa service, the emigration 
of research personnel from Russia reached 5-6 thousand per year. However, 
independent assessments put the number as at least three times more. The 
huge gap in these figures is caused by a larger number of researchers who end 
up abroad initially having left the country with a temporary work contract, 
but then deciding to stay on. This became a widespread practise among 
postgraduate students going abroad to continue education or to take post-
doctoral positions. According to a survey of undergraduate students of the 
leading Russian science and technological universities conducted in 1999, 
about one half of them were contemplating emigration and 10-12 per cent 
had already successfully obtained definite employment proposals from abroad 
(Климантова et al., 2001). 
Thus, during the decade of economic decline human capital mismatch 
manifested itself mainly in underemployment (underutilization) of skilled 
labour. The inevitable result was undervaluation and gradual degradation of a 
substantial part of accumulated human capital and in some cases irreversible 
loss of unique technical qualifications and know-how bases, which caused 
path-dependence traps.
4.  Challenges of Recovery 
Economic recovery in the late 1990s was accompanied by a revival of demand 
for different kinds of labour, which increased competition among employers 
in the labour market. The recovery state was characterized by the emergence 
of the following types of manpower deficits, which was reflected in human 
capital mismatches, viz., one, professionals in information communication 
technology (ICT) and technical occupations, two, high quality managerial 
staff, three, skilled manual workers, four, unskilled service and auxiliary 
personnel, and five, spatial disproportion between labour supply and 
demand. The foundations for the structural manpower shortages were laid 
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enterprises and the R&D sector during the 1990s leaving Russia with an 
ageing workforce. It was market transformation of the educational system 
that accelerated the exacerbation of disproportions in the national human 
capital stock.
Reforms in the education system of Russia started along with the overall 
economic reforms and were based on the same logic of market economy. The 
architects argued that reliance on market forces in this sphere will eventually 
lead to better performance and produce gains in efficiency and quality of 
education. The practical implementation of these reforms started with a 
reduction in state educational budget. During the 1990s the GDP share of 
educational expenditure fell from 4.2 to 3.1 per cent, which when the crisis 
is taken into account, translated to a substantial fall in the real expenditure 
advanced to education. In fact, it fell to half the amount expended on 
education before reforms were introduced. Not only was the state’s financial 
expenditure on education cut down, it also gradually lost control over the 
activities of the higher education institutions. The steady cut in government 
educational spending in the 1990s was accompanied by a rapid growth in 
the number of all sorts of universities, which led to a fall in the quality of 
education – though the enrolment numbers continued to rise (see Figure 
1). According to expert opinion, only about 15 per cent of universities and 
academies currently operating in Russia meet the requirements of European 
quality standards (Вербицкая, 2006; Гольдфельд, 2007).
Figure 1: University Education Enrolment, Russia, 1990-2008 (millions)
Source: Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/,     
accessed on 3 January 2011.248      Irina Soboleva  
The shortage in technical occupations is a logical outcome of reliance on 
market forces in the sphere of education. In the second decade since reforms 
started, the breakdown between different branches of university education 
has been influenced mainly by demand of families (parents) possessing little 
information on the trends of labour market development. As a result, during 
the last decade the share of economic and managerial freshmen grew from 
18 per cent of overall university admission to 34 per cent with their absolute 
numbers increasing fivefold. For the most popular technical occupations – e.g. 
ICT, the share only grew from 1.5 to 2.1 per cent while the absolute number 
increased by 3.4 times. For the rest of technical occupations the growth was 
much less if any. According to expert assessments there is an over-saturation 
of labour market with economists and lawyers and a shortage of innovative 
occupations with best demand prospects. This overly high desire for becoming 
economists, managers or lawyers stems from a lack of information available 
to school dropouts and their families (Болотов, 2003). 
Market failure from imperfect information flows has caused the degrada-
tion of quality standards in the education sector, which explains the shortage 
of skilled managerial personnel despite rapid expansion of the educational 
segment target at producing market-oriented professionals. Newly created 
private universities have been churning out massive numbers of graduates 
with managerial degrees but they end up with little demand from the real 
market place. According to an independent survey conducted in Povoljskiy 
Federal district of Russia, more than 80 per cent of employers stated that at 
least every second university graduate they employ needs serious additional 
training right away. The ‘worst marks’ from employers were received by 
graduates from the freshly expanded managerial and economic branches of 
university education.
The growing deficits in skilled workers arose from the fact that the 
outflow of this category from industrial enterprises was poorly compensated 
by newcomers because of the gradual destruction of vocational, and to a lesser 
extent, lower level tertiary education (see Table 5). 
Factors undermining the vocational system of education are of both 
economic and cultural origins. On the one hand, the destruction of ‘working 
class culture’ led to growing unwillingness of young people (usually supported 
by parents) to choose manual occupations. On the other hand, the lowering of 
entrance competition standards made academic requirements for admission to 
universities relatively easy to meet. Also, the reliance on consumer demand in 
shaping the composition of the educational system led to a gradual squeezing 
out of the vocational level thereby seriously disregarding the growing labour 
market demand for skilled workers and mid-level technical specialists. 
The proliferation of private universities and the aspirations of the younger 
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the shortage in low skilled occupations, especially in services and construc-
tion. These niches increasingly attracted migrants from the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) countries ready to serve for low wages and poor 
working conditions. The inflow of migrant labour to fill up low-skilled jobs 
contributed to the segmentation of the human capital stock in Russia.
The recent economic crisis had a substantial impact on the structure of 
labour demand. According to expert assessments large ICT companies reduced 
their white-collar office personnel by at least 10-15 per cent, in oil-and-gas 
companies the reduction was up to 20 per cent (Алексеева and Гахова, 2010). 
They pointed out however, that during the upswing, Russian companies were 
characterized by over-employment of managerial and clerical staff when 
compared to their Western counterparts. At the same time the employers are 
often reluctant to part with their skilled workers and experienced engineers 
and technicians so as to retain them until the next upturn begins, believing that 
it would be extremely difficult to find them when growth resumed.
Growing Spatial Disproportions
GDP growth at the start was initiated by a devaluation of the Rouble 
against the US dollar in August 1998 and hence, which helped raise the 
competitiveness of national exports. Rising oil prices took over as the 
main vehicle of growth since 2003. The mechanism gave impetus to rapid 
development of only a limited number of globally competitive industries, 
which added to the structural bias in economy and to inter-industry and 
interregional differentiation. The key beneficiaries when growth resumed 
among the working population were those employed in successfully 
globalizing extractive industries and in the new sectors of information and 
financial infrastructure concentrated largely in Moscow and Saint-Petersburg. 
The best jobs that offered decent wages and career prospects were provided by 
foreign or joint stock companies with headquarters and representation offices 
located mainly in the capitals and other big cities.
Within the well-to-do localities hosting successful enterprises and 
financial infrastructure, skilled manpower deficits were overcome by the 
development of mechanisms compensating for the failures of the formal 
educational system. Oil-and-gas companies set up corporate universities and 
sponsored a wide variety of training programs. Thus, enclaves of human 
capital restoration grew, which also attracted the most skilled and ambitious 
people from stagnating sectors and parts of the country. Consequently, during 
the period of economic recovery, financial and intangible resources as well 
as career and earnings opportunities became more and more concentrated 
in about 10 per cent of the Russian cities – mostly regional capitals and 
administrative centres. In 2010 they comprised about one third of Russia’s Human Capital Development in Russia      251
population, producing between 40 and 70 per cent of gross regional product 
(GRP) depending on region. They also generally attract between 40 and 80 per 
cent of total investment. Thus, the majority of the Russian population living 
in small and middle-sized cities and rural areas are faced with considerably 
worse career and earnings opportunities when compared to people dwelling 
in big cities and capitals (see Figure 2). 
Thus, moving from rural to urban areas or from a small town to a large 
city made it possible for individuals to augment returns on human capital a 
couple of times more than otherwise, which stimulated an outflow of young 
and mobile people from rural areas and small settlements to large cities. The 
largest migration is to the city of Moscow and the Moscow region leaving 
sparse territories in the centre of the European part of Russia to less skilled 
and ambitious people and to the older generations.
The inflow of ‘oil money’ and the development of globalized enclaves in 
the Russian economy gave impetus to the gradual modification of the brain 
drain process. The recovery stage was characterized by improved living 
conditions at least in the capitals and large cities. However, at the same time, 
the demand for innovative research from domestic industry began to fall as 
the amount of public R&D spending faced further trimming. Local firms 
and research institutions have thus been unable to offer globally competitive 
terms of employment to the elite strata of national human resources. This 
Figure 2: Relative Median Wage by Place of Living, Russia, 1998-2008
Note:   Calculated upon Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey Data.
Source:  “Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE”, conducted by 
Higher School of Economics and ZAO “Demoscope” together with 
Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
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environment has instead encouraged researchers, engineers and other skilled 
workers to participate in outsourcing activities facilitated by developments 
in ICT. In such circumstances a good deal of researchers, engineers and 
other categories of skilled workers have opted to remain in Russia but 
supplying their labour to Western companies and research institutions. 
Expert assessments show that at least 10 thousand Russian scientists worked 
for American firms and another 20 thousand for European firms in 2005 
(Юревич, 2006). 
The profile of outsourcing in Russia has distinct features that differentiate 
it from other countries. Whereas firms in India and China undertake labour-
intensive and formalized tasks like data processing, database administration 
and call-centre services (Khan and Islam, 2006), Russian researchers are 
often hired to solve non-standard problems like aerodynamic design for new 
versions of Boeing performed by the Institute of Applied Mathematics of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). 
Consequently, the long-term impact of outsourcing on national economic 
and human capital development appears uncertain. On the one hand, out-
sourcing represents a more refined version of brain drain when Russian 
human capital is used to the benefit of the United States and Western 
Europe and in the process of strengthening their competitiveness in the 
global economy. On the other hand, it may be regarded as a normal form of 
international cooperation bringing benefits to both parties as researchers in 
Russia are argued to enjoy higher salaries than otherwise. It should be borne 
in mind that the process of globalization inevitably implies redistribution 
of the world human capital stock to the advantage of the strongest and the 
richest countries. It may also mitigate greater losses that arise from direct 
brain drain. Performing skilled tasks for foreign employers are accompanied 
by acquiring new competences and know-how, and hence, adds to the 
accumulation of human capital, which would otherwise be lost either through 
underemployment or emigration. It is also important that in the absence of 
adequate support from the state, outsourcing is often used as a means of 
obtaining necessary financing for supporting national research institutions. 
A typical example is the Institute of Catalysis – which belongs to the Siberia 
branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences – where revenues from contracts 
with foreign firms constitute approximately one third of the yearly budget and 
are spent mainly on equipment, technology and software. 
Thus, the second decade of reforms had a controversial impact on national 
human capital development. On the one hand, it was characterized by the 
emergence and exacerbation of new types of human capital mismatches. On 
the other hand, the revival of labour demand and the partial substitution of 
open brain drain for outsourcing widened opportunities for the preservation 
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5.  Conclusions and Implications
Until recently, an abundance of high quality national human capital was 
considered the key competitive advantage of Russia. However, during the 
two post-Soviet decades this potential competitive advantage generated little 
or no visible results. From a strong military-based industrial economy, Russia 
was gradually primitivized into a middle level economy heavily dependent 
on oil and gas to drive economic growth with negligible share of innovative 
goods and services in both GDP and exports. The reality of today is that the 
growing deficit in human capital has become a limiting factor of sustainable 
economic development in Russia.
The root causes of the problems of the second decade of reforms lie in 
the first decade of reforms when spontaneous liberalization of the economy to 
market forces was not coordinated through a coherent policy aimed at correct-
ing structural biases in the economy, ensuring the effective utilization of man-
power and the accumulation of human capital, and at providing an adequate 
safety net for the preservation of national human resources. The inevitable 
result was the primitivization of the Russian economy and mass underemploy-
ment of skilled labour, which triggered two types of brain drain. The first took 
place through classical emigration and the other through an outflow of skilled 
labour into survival activities, which caused a gradual degradation of human 
capital. In some cases it caused an irreversible loss of unique technical quali-
fications and know-how bases and eventually, which trapped the country into 
path-dependency problems as skill mismatches began to expand.
The degradation of human capital in the first decade of reforms had 
a damaging effect on human capital development in the second decade of 
reforms as the mismatches and disproportions it exacerbated caused strong 
labour market segmentation. Private universities targeting soft disciplines such 
as economics and management began to attract more demand when economic 
growth in Russia during the second decade demanded more technical 
graduates. The proliferation of outsourcing activities did mitigate against 
direct brain drain, though the professionals involved worked for Western 
rather than national companies.
The 2008-2009 global financial crisis may bring controversial conse-
quences to national human capital development policies. The current 
problem of unsatisfied demand for skilled manpower coincided with cuts in 
employment in the shuttle trade engendered by the crisis. The crisis affected 
the services sector and was accompanied by mass layoffs of low and mid-level 
office employees, reduction of shadow salary payments and overall worsening 
of employment conditions of office personnel in private firms. The artificially 
booming labour market for ‘quasi-professionals’ shrank harshly owing to 
a rising share of freshly graduating university degree holders becoming 
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There are several ways in which the crisis may affect national human 
capital development in a positive way. First, through a reduction of surplus 
managerial and clerical workers, it can force them into further education 
or retraining. Second, it can cut down the previously common practice of 
combining university education with full time employment, and hence, it may 
lead to improved educational outcomes in the universities. Third, coupled with 
the special measures undertaken by the state to support R&D, the slackening 
demand for managerial and sales staff and deterioration of employment 
conditions in the formerly prosperous sectors of national and world economy 
may curtail brain drain practices and encourage more young people to opt for 
research and technical occupations within the country. 
The crisis may also generate negative consequences if the manufacturing 
enterprises take on a ‘demographic concave’ (elderly core workers training 
scarce young newcomers with no middle generation in between) position 
against slackening demand for labour in the ‘real sector’ of economy as it 
is fraught with feeble threads of intergenerational skill exchanges. It could 
also lead to a return to deskilling in these areas if the anchor enterprises close 
down thereby causing unemployment to soar. 
Notes
*    I would like to thank Carlota Perez and Hoang Nguyen who provided useful 
comments and suggestions when the previous version of this paper was presented 
at the 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 1-3 November 2010. My special 
thanks are due to Rajah Rasiah who took considerable trouble to edit this paper. 
All mistakes remain mine.
1.    The public sector to this day is de facto divided into the privileged sector of 
public administration employment in Russia guaranteeing decent wages, social 
package and higher pensions upon retirement, while the rest of the employees 
financed from the state budget are engaged mainly in occupations of the social 
sphere – education, health and culture.
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